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I. INTRODUCTION 
However articulated, the law of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (NIED) 
[I]s fundamentally concerned with striking a balance 
between two opposing objectives: first, promoting the 
underlying purpose of negligence law––that of 
compensating persons who have sustained emotional 
injuries attributable to the wrongful conduct of others; 
and second, avoiding the trivial or fraudulent claims that 
have been thought to be inevitable due to the subjective 
nature of these injuries.1   
The challenge is to refine “principles of liability to remedy 
violations of reasonable care while avoiding speculative results or 
punitive liability.”2  Courts are often skeptical of mental anguish 
damages because they are easy to fabricate and exaggerate, and 
difficult to confirm, measure, and quantify.  Accordingly, most 
courts recognize that there is generally no duty to avoid negligently 
inflicting emotional distress on others unless the activity falls within 
a narrow exception.3   
 
 1. Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn. 1996). 
 2. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1980).   
 3. E.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 807 (Cal. 1993) 
(“There is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to another . . . 
.”); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594–96 (Tex. 1993) (rejecting the contention 
2
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Under Minnesota law, unless specifically authorized by statute 
the only exceptions to this general “no duty rule” are where (1) the 
emotional distress arose out of a physical injury (the “physical 
injury” rule); (2) the emotional distress arose out of the plaintiff’s 
exposure to physical danger (the “zone of danger” rule); and (3) 
“there has been some conduct on the part of defendant 
constituting a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that 
constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or 
other like willful, wanton, or malicious conduct” (the “direct 
invasion” rule).4 
An increasing trend in other jurisdictions is to recognize a 
duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress, independent 
of a physical injury or danger of physical injury, where the 
defendant violates some legal interest of the plaintiff involving a 
highly emotional subject matter.5  Types of activities typically 
triggering this rule include misdiagnosing serious diseases,6 
psychological malpractice,7 injuring a baby during or shortly after 
delivery,8 and mishandling corpses.9  This article refers to the rule 
adopted in these cases as the “independent duty rule.”  Although 
there is little consensus on how to define the scope of the 
independent duty rule, cases applying the rule can be generally 
grouped into three categories: (1) cases finding an independent 
 
that there is a general duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress on 
others); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986) (“[Traditionally 
t]here was no duty with respect to negligent acts which caused purely mental harm 
where there was no impact or threat of impact upon someone in the zone of 
danger.”).   
 4. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560 
(Minn. 1996). 
 5. Because independent duty cases typically involve breaching a duty owed 
directly to the plaintiff, they are distinguishable from bystander cases, where the 
plaintiff only witnesses the breach against the directly impacted victim.  See also 
Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992) (“[Bystander cases] all 
arise in the context of physical injury or emotional distress caused by the negligent 
conduct of a defendant with whom the plaintiff had no preexisting relationship, 
and to whom the defendant had not previously assumed a duty of care beyond 
that owed to the public in general.”); Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 204 
(Alaska 1995) (quoting Burgess for the same proposition); Sacco v. High Country 
Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 419 (Mont. 1995) (“Bystander victims are those 
who observe the injury or death of another person and suffer resultant emotional 
distress.”).  This article does not address bystander recovery.   
 6. E.g., Chizmar, 896 P.2d at 205. 
 7. E.g., Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 358 (Fla. 2002). 
 8. E.g., Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981). 
 9. E.g., Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 312, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (1891). 
3
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duty because of a special relationship between the parties;10 (2) 
cases finding an independent duty because emotional distress was a 
foreseeable consequence of the breach;11 and (3) cases finding an 
independent duty for specified categories of emotionally-charged 
activities as a matter of public policy.12  A tentative draft of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm (Third Restatement) endorses this third approach.13 
This article provides a brief overview of Minnesota law on 
recovering damages for emotional distress,14 collects and 
summarizes foreign authorities endorsing and defining the 
independent duty rule,15 and advocates for adopting a narrow 
independent duty rule in Minnesota.16  If carefully constructed, the 
independent duty rule is more consistent with the roots of 
Minnesota law on emotional distress claims, better serves the 
general principle of providing compensation for legitimate 
injuries, adequately guards against frivolous claims reaching juries, 
does not upset any of the justifications traditionally cited for 
denying NIED recovery, and makes sense from a public policy 
standpoint.   
The proposed rule takes an approach similar to that tentatively 
endorsed by the Third Restatement, but would include guidelines 
for courts when defining categories of protected activities.17  Some 
courts have borrowed the guidelines that many courts use when 
determining whether to make an exception to the general duty 
rule in physical injury cases.18  These guidelines, however, do not 
adequately advance the main objective in defining categories of 
activities deserving of protection from negligently inflicted 
emotional distress—providing a threshold guarantee that only 
genuine emotional injuries can reach juries.  Accordingly, courts 
 
 10. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 11. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 12. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 46(b) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. E.g., Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167 (Alaska 2002); Burgess v. 
Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1205–09 (Cal. 1992); Friedman v. Merck & Co., 
131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 891 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 
561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 203–04 (Wyo. 
2003). 
4
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should analyze whether there is a duty to avoid negligently 
inflicting emotional distress on a categorical basis—as opposed to 
examining the facts of each individual case—by considering a 
number of factors:  
1. Does the relevant industry recognize a standard of care 
that requires the defendant to prevent emotional distress? 
2. Does the legal interest involve a highly emotional 
subject matter? 
3. Is there a special relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant? 
4. Is the occurrence of emotional distress a foreseeable 
consequence of the breach?  
5. Is the injury likely to be experienced by an appreciable 
number of the population, as opposed to a rare, 
idiosyncratic, hypersensitive or unusual minority?   
6. Is the category narrowly defined to ensure 
commonality?   
7. Have other jurisdictions recognized a duty for that 
particular category of activity? 
8. Do other circumstances provide some guarantee that 
claims of emotional distress will be genuine and material?  
9. Do strong countervailing public policy considerations 
militate against imposing a duty? 
These factors are designed to reduce trivial or speculative 
claims, while providing a threshold guarantee that claims of 
emotional distress arising out of a protected category of activities 
are genuine. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MINNESOTA LAW ON NEGLIGENTLY 
INFLICTED EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
As in most states, Minnesota disfavors claims seeking damages 
for emotional distress.19  Because psychological injury can be highly 
subjective and easily feigned, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
explained that allowing recovery without an accompanying physical 
injury presents the potential for speculative, trivial, exaggerated, 
and/or contrived claims reaching a jury.20  Accordingly, Minnesota 
 
 19. Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn. 1983) 
(“Tort claims seeking damages for mental distress generally have not been favored 
in Minnesota.”). 
 20. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560 
(Minn. 1996); Garvis v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 n.3 (Minn. 
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law restricts “the availability of such damages to those plaintiffs who 
prove that emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending 
to guarantee its genuineness.”21  Minnesota courts currently 
recognize only three such circumstances.22  Each has roots dating 
 
1993); see also Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 261–62, 59 N.W. 1078, 
1080 (1894) (“The suffering of one under precisely the same circumstances would 
be no test of the suffering of another, and there being no possible standard by 
which such an injury can be even approximately measured, they are subject to 
many, if not most, of the objections to speculative damages which are universally 
excluded.”). 
 21. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 438 (“Our past reluctance to provide a direct 
remedy through the recognition of an independent tort reflects a policy 
consideration that an independent claim of mental anguish is speculative and so 
likely to lead to fictitious allegations that there is a considerable potential for 
abuse of the judicial process.”).  Minnesota law also requires that the emotional 
distress be premised upon a “physical manifestation.”  Leaon v. Washington Cnty., 
397 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Minn. 1986).  The threshold guarantees of trustworthiness 
that justify imposing an independent duty provide a substantial basis to depart 
from this archaic and rather arbitrary “physical manifestation” requirement.  See 
Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Me. 1987) 
(“[T]he requirement of physical manifestation of mental distress was both over-
inclusive . . . and underinclusive . . . .” (citing Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, 
Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982))); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771 
(Mo. 1983) (“[T]he requirement of physical injury resulting from the emotional 
distress merely meant the replacement of one arbitrary, artificial rule with another 
which was only somewhat less restrictive.”); Boorman v. Nev. Med. Cremation 
Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010) (“[O]ur historical concern that emotional distress 
must be demonstrated by some physical manifestation of emotional distress is not 
implicated in this context.  We need not question the trustworthiness of an 
individual’s emotional anguish in cases involving desecration of a loved one’s 
remains.”); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1979) (“Advancements in modern 
science lead us to . . . conclude that psychic injury is capable of being proven 
despite the absence of a physical manifestation of such injury.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. g (Tentative 
Draft No. 5, 2007) (“The requirements that the harm be serious, that the 
circumstances of the case be such that a reasonable person would suffer serious 
harm, and that there be credible evidence that the plaintiff has suffered such 
harm better serve the purpose of screening claims than a requirement of physical 
consequences.”).  The physical manifestation and other requirements related to 
the extent of the damages suffered are beyond the scope of this article. 
 22. Lickteig, 556 N.W.2d at 560 (recognizing recovery for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress if (1) the plaintiff “suffers a physical injury as a result of 
another’s negligence”; (2) the plaintiff “was actually exposed to physical harm as a 
result of the negligence of another (the ‘zone-of-danger’ rule)”; and (3) where 
“there has been a ‘direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that constituting 
slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or 
malicious conduct.’” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 
Minn. 360, 368, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963))).  Although no Minnesota court has 
expressly framed this as a duty issue, courts from other jurisdictions have properly 
analyzed whether NIED damages can reach a jury under the rubric of the duty 
analysis.  See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 807 (Cal. 
6
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back over a century.23   
The Minnesota Supreme Court first recognized the right to 
recover damages for emotional distress in 1886.24  It confined 
recovery to “mental distress and anxiety which . . . is connected 
with the bodily injury, and is fairly and reasonably the plain 
consequence of such injury.”25 
Six years later, the court allowed emotional distress recovery 
without a physical impact where the plaintiff suffered fright from 
riding in a streetcar that nearly collided with a cable train.26  This 
“zone of danger” basis of recovery has been limited over the years 
to require the plaintiff to show that he or she (1) was within the 
“zone of danger” of physical impact; (2) reasonably feared for his 
or her own safety; and (3) suffered severe emotional distress with 
attendant physical manifestations.27  This basis for recovery was also 
recently expanded to include a very limited bystander recovery rule 
for those whose emotional distress arose out of concern for the 
safety of others.28 
 
1993) (recognizing that there is not a duty for one to avoid negligently inflicting 
emotional distress on another person in California); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 
509, 518 (Haw. 1970) (“The cases contain the broad statement that there is no 
duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of mental distress.  Thus the 
paramount issue is characterized as one of duty: whether the plaintiff’s interest in 
freedom from mental distress is entitled to legal protection from Defendant’s 
conduct.” (citation omitted)); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594–96 (Tex. 1993) 
(rejecting contention that there is a general duty to avoid negligently inflicting 
emotional distress on others); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195 (Wyo. 1986) 
(“[Traditionally t]here was no duty with respect to negligent acts which caused 
purely mental harm where there was no impact or threat of impact upon someone 
in the zone of danger.”).  This general rule will be referred to herein as the “no 
duty rule.” 
 23. See Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 137–39, 50 N.W. 1034, 
1034–35 (1892) (creating the zone of danger exception); Larson v. Chase, 47 
Minn. 307, 312, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (1891) (creating the direct invasion exception); 
Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 36 Minn. 290, 293, 30 N.W. 888, 889 (1886) 
(creating the physical injury exception). 
 24. Keyes, 36 Minn. at 293, 30 N.W. at 889. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Purcell, 48 Minn. at 137–39, 50 N.W. at 1034–35.  The plaintiff’s fright 
resulted in convulsions, a miscarriage, and later, an illness.  Id. 
 27. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995). 
 28. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 2005).  In 
order to recover for distress caused by fear for another’s safety, the plaintiff must 
prove that he or she “(1) was in the zone of danger of physical impact; (2) had an 
objectively reasonable fear for her own safety; (3) had severe emotional distress 
with attendant physical manifestations; (4) stands in a close relationship to the 
third-party victim”; and (5) that “the defendant’s conduct—the conduct that 
created an unreasonable risk of physical injury to the plaintiff—caused serious 
7
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Finally, in 1891 the supreme court expanded emotional 
distress recovery to situations where “the act complained of 
constitutes a violation of some legal right of the plaintiff.”29  As 
discussed in more detail in Part IV, this “direct invasion” exception 
has evolved over the years to only allow recovery in cases involving 
“slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or other 
[invasions] like willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct.”30 
III. THE INDEPENDENT DUTY RULE 
A. An Introduction to the Independent Duty Rule 
In recent years, courts from across the country have soundly 
criticized the traditional rule requiring proof of physical injury or 
fear of physical injury before allowing compensation for emotional 
distress.  The most common criticism is that the physical injury rule 
is both overinclusive and underinclusive.  It is “overinclusive in 
permitting recovery for emotional distress when the suffering 
accompanies or results in any physical injury whatever, no matter 
how trivial,” and “underinclusive because it mechanically denies 
court access to claims that may well be valid and could be proved if 
the plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial.”31  In addition, “from a 
 
bodily injury to the third-party victim.”  Id. at 770–71. 
 29. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 312, 50 N.W. 238, 240 (1891). 
 30. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 368, 122 
N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963).  In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals endorsed 
using the pattern jury instruction for willful behavior for purposes of determining 
whether the direct invasion exception has been satisfied.  Gooch v. N. Country 
Reg’l Hosp., No. A05-576, 2006 WL 771384, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006).  
According to that instruction, “a person behaves willfully when he or she knows or 
has reason to know that an act is prohibited by a policy, rule, regulation, statute, or 
law and intentionally does it anyway.”  Id. (citing 4 MINN.  PRACTICE SERIES, JURY 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 25.40 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp 
1999)).  The Gooch court also endorsed using the Black’s Law Dictionary definition 
for wanton misconduct: “[A]n act, or failure to act when there is a duty to do so, in 
reckless disregard of another’s rights, coupled with the knowledge that injury will 
probably result.”  Id. at *4 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (7th ed. 1999)).  
In Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996), 
the supreme court declined to recognize that legal malpractice is inherently 
willful, reiterating that “[t]here must be a direct violation of the plaintiff’s rights 
by willful, wanton or malicious conduct; mere negligence is not sufficient.”  Id. at 
562. 
 31. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980); see also 
Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 202 (Alaska 1995) (quoting Molien and 
recognizing that “[s]uch concerns have prompted a growing number of 
jurisdictions to abandon the physical injury requirement altogether”); St. 
8
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purely practical point of view, it was proving difficult if not 
impossible to separate physical injury from what was to be 
considered purely mental and emotional reaction.”32  As one court 
aptly observed, using artificial limitations to prohibit entire classes 
of emotional distress claims “solely because some of the actions may 
be tainted by mischief is like ‘employing a cannon to kill a flea.’”33 
From a historical perspective, the physical injury limitation was 
created at a time when the only proof of emotional distress was the 
plaintiff’s own, often self-serving, testimony.  More recently, courts 
are increasingly recognizing that “with ‘today’s more advanced 
state of medical science, technology and testing techniques,’ 
evidence of physical injury [is] not necessary to adequately 
determine whether a party [has] suffered emotional distress.”34  
Another court observed that “expert witnesses such as psychiatrist 
[sic], psychologists and social workers are fully capable of providing 
the jury with an analysis of a plaintiff’s emotional injuries.”35  As 
early as 1970, the Hawaii Supreme Court also recognized these 
realities and concluded that “[i]t can no longer be said that the 
advantages gained by the courts in administering claims of mental 
distress by reference to narrow categories outweigh the burden 
thereby imposed on the plaintiff.”36  Accordingly, in addition to 
being arbitrary, the traditional justifications for strict physical injury 
and zone of danger limitations are largely antiquated. 
But, expanding emotional distress recovery involves a delicate 
balance.  On one hand, there is no doubt that “[c]omplete 
emotional tranquillity [sic] is seldom attainable in this world, and 
some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of 
 
Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. 1987) (citing and 
paraphrasing Molien), overruled on other grounds by Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 
(Tex. 1993) (“Therefore, we overrule the language of Garrard to the extent that it 
recognizes an independent right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress.”); Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 
67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1992). 
 32. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Mo. 1983). 
 33. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Nehring v. 
Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 79 (Wyo. 1978)). 
 34. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 425 (Mont. 1995) 
(quoting Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 588 (Mont. 1983)); see also Sinn 
v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1979) (“Advancements in modern science lead us 
to . . . conclude that psychic injury is capable of being proven despite the absence 
of a physical manifestation of such injury.”). 
 35. Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 609 (Ill. 1991). 
 36. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)  
9
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the price of living among people.”37  But at the same time, “the 
human psyche can be injured in a way that is every bit as real as 
slicing through flesh or crushing bones,”38 and “is as much entitled 
to legal protection as is . . . physical well-being.”39  Many courts have 
recognized that a narrowly defined independent duty rule strikes 
an appropriate balance between these extremes, while providing 
adequate threshold guarantees of trustworthiness.40 
But to say that the defendant had an independent duty is only 
“‘a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to 
analysis in itself.’”41  The concept of a “‘duty’ is not sacrosanct in 
itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular 
plaintiff is entitled to protection.”42  Accordingly, to understand 
what it means to have an independent duty to avoid causing 
emotional distress, it is necessary to examine how courts have 
defined the scope of the duty and the circumstances under which it 
has been adopted.  Approaches followed by different jurisdictions 
can be loosely grouped into three categories: (1) the foreseeability 
approach; (2) the special relationship approach; and (3) the 
categorical approach. 
 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965). 
 38. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 618 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting). 
 39. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283 (Me. 
1987). 
 40. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167 (Alaska 2002) (“The 
bystander and preexisting duty exceptions permit recovery for [NIED] in the 
absence of physical injury because they ‘represent isolated situations where courts 
have found that the special circumstances surrounding a claim for emotional 
damages serve as a sufficient guarantee that the claim is neither false nor 
insubstantial.’” (quoting Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 202 (Alaska 1995))); 
Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 205 (Wyo. 2003) (“[T]he independent 
duty exception . . . is sufficiently limited in scope so as to avoid an overwhelming 
burden.”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 849 (2000) (“When the 
defendant owes an independent duty of care to the plaintiff, there is no risk of 
unlimited liability to an unlimited number of people.  Liability turns solely on 
relationships accepted by the defendant, usually under a contractual 
arrangement.”). 
 41. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (quoting WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 332–33 (3d ed. 1964)). 
 42. Id. 
10
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B. Different Formulations of the Independent Duty Rule 
1. Foreseeability Approach 
A few jurisdictions recognize a duty when emotional distress 
was a foreseeable consequence of the breach. 
In Gammon, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court declared that 
foreseeability alone “provides adequate protection against unduly 
burdensome liability claims for emotional distress.”43  Using the 
classic case of mishandling a corpse as an illustration, the court 
reasoned that foreseeability and genuineness of the injury go hand-
in-hand: 
Courts have concluded that the exceptional vulnerability 
of the family of recent decedents makes it highly probable 
that emotional distress will result from mishandling the 
body.  That high probability is said to provide sufficient 
trustworthiness to allay the court’s fear of fraudulent 
claims.  This rationale, it seems, is but another way of 
determining that the defendant reasonably should have 
foreseen that mental distress would result from his 
negligence.44 
The court found further comfort by rejecting the “eggshell” 
plaintiff doctrine for NIED claims.45  According to the court, “[a] 
defendant is bound to foresee psychic harm only when such harm 
reasonably could be expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive 
person.”46  Applying this test to the facts, it found “no sound basis to 
preclude potential compensation” to the plaintiff, who suffered 
emotional distress upon finding a human leg in a bag that he 
believed contained his recently deceased father’s personal 
belongings.47 
The North Carolina Supreme Court viewed the foreseeability 
approach as striking an appropriate balance between the harshness 
of the physical impact rule and the potential for abuse if recovery 
 
 43. Gammon, 534 A.2d at 1285.  The court characterized the following 
traditional limitations on NIED recovery as “more or less arbitrary”: proof of a 
physical impact, an objective manifestation of the mental distress, an underlying 
or accompanying tort, and special circumstances.  Id. at 1283. 
 44. Id. at 1285 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 45. See id. (“We do not foresee any great extension of tort liability by our 
ruling today.  We do not provide compensation for the hurt feelings of the 
supersensitive plaintiff . . . .”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1283, 1286.  
11
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were allowed for temporary fright or disappointment.48  According 
to the court in Johnson, damages for NIED are recoverable “if the 
plaintiff can prove that he or she has suffered such severe 
emotional distress as a proximate and foreseeable result of the 
defendant’s negligence.”49  It explained that foreseeability is the 
appropriate standard because: 
If recovery is limited to instances where it would be 
generally viewed as appropriate and not excessive, then, 
by definition, the defendant’s liability is commensurate 
with the damage that the defendant’s conduct caused.  
Further, the judicial system would not be overburdened 
by administering fair and proper claims.  Additionally, our 
trial courts have adequate means available to them for 
disposing of improper claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and for adjusting excessive or 
inadequate verdicts.50   
Accordingly, the Johnson court held that the mother of a stillborn 
fetus properly stated a claim for NIED against her physician who 
wrongfully caused the fetus’ death.51 
The Missouri Supreme Court also concluded that the 
foreseeability test struck the appropriate balance between “unduly 
extending liability to situations where the defendant’s acts 
constitute socially desirable activity and his blame is only slight,” 
and the unfairness, inequity and arbitrariness of the now-
antiquated impact rule.52  The court thus endorsed imposing a duty 
if “the defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an 
unreasonable risk of causing the distress.”53  Under the particular 
 
 48. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 
(N.C. 1990).  In rejecting the physical impact test and overruling a prior decision 
suggesting that a physical impact was a prerequisite, the court noted that 
“[c]ommon sense and precedent tell us that a defendant’s negligent act toward 
one person may proximately and foreseeably cause emotional distress to another 
person and justify his recovering damages, depending upon their relationship and 
other factors present in the particular case.”  Id. at 95. 
 49. Id. at 97 (emphases omitted).  The Montana Supreme Court has adopted 
a nearly identical test.  See Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 
425 (Mont. 1995) (“A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
will arise under circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the 
plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent 
act or omission.”). 
 50. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 98 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 51. Id. at 87, 99. 
 52. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983). 
 53. Id.   
12
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facts of the case, it found that there was a fact issue for trial on 
whether “these defendants could anticipate that an ordinary person 
normally constituted would succumb to serious emotional distress 
by reason of being trapped in a stalled elevator.”54   
2. Special Relationship Approach 
A growing number of jurisdictions recognize that certain 
special relationships give rise to an independent duty to avoid 
negligently inflicting emotional distress.55  As a general proposition, 
courts using this approach look for the existence of some special 
contractual or statutory relationship involving the plaintiff’s 
particular vulnerability or susceptibility to emotional distress. 
For instance, in Burgess v. Superior Court,56 the California 
Supreme Court held that recovery is allowed “in cases where a duty 
arising from a preexisting relationship is negligently breached.”57  
The plaintiff sought to recover for emotional distress arising out of 
witnessing physical injuries to her child during birth.58  After easily 
finding the doctor-patient relationship created a duty of care,59 the 
 
 54. Id. at 773.  The court suggested that evidence relevant to this question 
would be the maximum period of entrapment that might reasonably be 
contemplated, the method of release, and the physical hazard presented during 
rescue.  Id. at 773 nn.5–6. 
 55. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 849. (“The idea that a contractual or similar 
relationship can bespeak a duty assumed by the defendant or one imposed by law 
is itself of respectable lineage.”). 
 56. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992). 
 57. Id. at 1201.  Twelve years earlier, the same court had strongly suggested 
that the existence of a duty to avoid causing emotional distress is governed by a 
strict foreseeability standard.  See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 
816–17 (Cal. 1980) (discussing at length the role of foreseeability in the duty 
analysis and finding the existence of a duty in large part because “[i]n the case at 
bar the risk of harm to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable to defendants.”).  Nine 
years later, the court backed away from a strict foreseeability approach, stating “it 
is clear that foreseeability of the injury alone is not a useful ‘guideline’ or a 
meaningful restriction on the scope of the NIED action.”  Thing v. La Chusa, 771 
P.2d 814, 826 (Cal. 1989).  The Burgess court expressly overruled Molien to the 
extent it purported to introduce “a new method for determining the existence of a 
duty, limited only by the concept of foreseeability.”  Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1201.   
 58. See Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1199.   
 59. Id. at 1201.  The court noted that the existence of a preexisting 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant made this a “direct victim” 
case, which is distinguishable from bystander cases.  Id. at 1200.  The major 
concern in bystander cases is the possibility of exposing the tortfeasor to a limitless 
class of plaintiffs, which could result in the imposition of liability out of proportion 
to the culpability of the defendant.  Thing, 771 P.2d at 826–27.  Accordingly, like 
many jurisdictions, bystander recovery in California is limited to situations where 
13
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court focused its analysis on the scope of the duty that the 
defendant physician owed the mother.60  It noted the physical and 
emotional connection between a mother and her fetus: 
It is in light of both these physical and emotional realities 
that the obstetrician and the pregnant woman enter into a 
physician-patient relationship.  It cannot be gainsaid that 
both parties understand that the physician owes a duty to 
the pregnant woman with respect to the medical 
treatment provided to her fetus.  Any negligence during 
delivery which causes injury to the fetus and resultant 
emotional anguish to the mother, therefore, breaches a 
duty owed directly to the mother.61 
Because the defendant’s negligent delivery of the plaintiff’s baby 
breached a duty that he owed to both the baby and the mother, the 
court explained that her “claim for emotional distress damages may 
simply be viewed as an ordinary professional malpractice claim, 
which seeks as an element of damage compensation for her serious 
emotional distress.”62   
 
 
 
the plaintiff “(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of 
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing 
injury to the victim and, (3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that 
which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness.”  Id. at 815.  The Burgess 
court made clear that these limitations do not apply to direct victim cases.  Burgess, 
831 P.2d at 1203. 
 60. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1202.  Later in the opinion, the court applied a multi-
factor balancing test to determine whether public policy considerations compel a 
finding of no duty.  Id. at 1205–09.  This portion of the opinion is discussed in 
more detail in Part V.  Before conducting the balancing test, however, the court 
declared that the result was predetermined because of the doctor-patient 
relationship.  Id. at 1205 (“Although in this case the existence of the applicable 
duty is clearly established by virtue of the physician-patient relationship between 
[the plaintiff and defendant], the considerations set forth above provide a 
framework for our review of [the defendant’s] policy arguments against imposing 
liability.”).  Thus, the court treated the balancing approach as necessary only to 
determine whether an exception should be made to the imposition of a duty in 
doctor-patient cases involving highly emotional subjects such as childbirth.  See id. 
at 1205–06 (describing the mother-child relationship during pregnancy).  
 61. Id. at 1203. 
 62. Id.  While generally touted as a seminal decision in this area, the Burgess 
decision leaves much to be desired when attempting to apply it outside the context 
of negligent childbirth because it does not clearly define what type of “preexisting 
relationship” is necessary to trigger an independent duty.  It is unclear, for 
example, whether the court was imputing the child’s physical harm to the mother, 
making a categorical exception for all medical malpractice cases, or limiting the 
duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress to childbirth cases.  
14
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An Alaska decision expanded upon the Burgess rule by 
adopting a hybrid foreseeability/special relationship approach.63  
After criticizing the strict foreseeability approach, the Alaska 
Supreme Court limited recovery to situations “where the defendant 
owes the plaintiff a preexisting duty.”64  Exactly what the court 
meant by “preexisting duty” is unclear from the opinion, but it 
found such a duty to exist where the plaintiff alleged her treating 
physician misdiagnosed her with AIDS.65  Instead of using 
foreseeability as an element of the duty analysis, the court held that 
the scope of the physician’s duty is to “refrain from activity which 
presented a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of causing 
emotional distress.”66  After taking judicial notice of the 
“unquestionable” “significance of a false imputation of AIDS,” it 
held that this allegation was sufficient to present a fact issue for the 
jury on the foreseeability and seriousness of the plaintiff’s 
emotional distress.67 
A Texas court has also endorsed a hybrid foreseeability/special 
relationship test that imposes a duty when emotional distress is “a 
foreseeable result of a breach of a duty arising out of certain 
‘special relationships.’”68  The Texas Court of Appeals aptly 
observed that “[s]pecial relationship cases generally have three 
common elements: (1) a contractual relationship between the 
parties, (2) a particular susceptibility to emotional distress on the 
part of the plaintiff, and (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to the emotional distress, based 
on the circumstances.”69  Applying this test, the court found that a 
special relationship existed between a county medical examiner’s 
office and the father of a recently deceased young child where the 
defendant had a statutory obligation to perform an autopsy, but 
 
 63. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203 (Alaska 1995).   
 64. Id.  The extent of the court’s criticism of the strict foreseeability approach 
was “[w]e do not believe that the traditional tort principle of foreseeability, 
standing alone, properly defines the scope of a defendant’s duty in an action for 
damages for negligently inflected emotional distress.”  Id.  The court was also 
careful to note that “a plaintiff may recover for only ‘severe’ or ‘serious’ emotional 
distress.”  Id. at 204. 
 65. Id. at 203.   
 66. Id. at 205.  The impact of this distinction is that foreseeability becomes a 
question for the jury, not the court.  Id.      
 67. Id. 
 68. Freeman v. Harris Cnty., 183 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. App. 2006) (citing 
Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Tex. 1997)).   
 69. Id.  
15
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lost the child’s body.70 
In Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II,71 the Oregon Supreme 
Court provided a somewhat more helpful explanation as to when 
emotional distress damages are recoverable in the context of 
special relationships.72  According to the court, the duty to avoid a 
specific type of harm is driven by the standard of care in that 
particular industry: 
[W]here the standard of care in a particular medical 
profession recognizes the possibility of adverse 
psychological reactions or consequences as a medical 
concern and dictates that certain precautions be taken to 
avoid or minimize it, the law will not insulate persons in 
that profession from liability if they fail in those duties, 
thereby causing the contemplated harm.73 
 Later Oregon decisions clarified that an industry standard to 
avoid emotional harm is not, in itself, determinative.74  Rather, “the 
legally protected interest so identified must be of sufficient 
importance to warrant the award of damages for emotional 
distress,” such as certain types of special relationships between the 
plaintiff and the defendant.75  Instead of declaring the existence of 
special relationships on a categorical basis (e.g., all doctor-patient 
 
 70. Id.  Although the plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with the 
defendant, the court noted that the statutory duty was a sufficient substitute.  Id.  
The statute at issue required the defendant medical examiner to conduct an 
autopsy on “a child who is younger than six years of age and the death is reported 
under Chapter 264, Family Code,” which governs child protective services.  TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 49.25 § 6(a)(7).  In an earlier, highly controversial 
decision, the Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize that an intimate sexual 
relationship gives rise to a special relationship because there was no “specific duty 
of care that, under the law, arises from the relationship.”  Boyles v. Kerr, 855 
S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex. 1993).  Thus the Boyles court refused to allow the plaintiff to 
recover for mental suffering when her companion surreptitiously videotaped their 
sexual relations and distributed it to persons in her social network.  Id.  
Accordingly, absent a contractual relationship, the statutory duty in Freeman was 
probably necessary for the imposition of a duty. 
 71. 956 P.2d 960 (Or. 1998). 
 72. See id. at 963. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 770 (Or. Ct. App. 
2005). 
 75. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  According to 
the Oregon Court of Appeals in another case, “the critical inquiry becomes 
whether the kind of interest invaded is of sufficient importance as a matter of 
policy to merit protection from emotional impact.”  Bennett v. Baugh, 961 P.2d 
883, 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (cittion omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 985 P.2d 1282 (1999). 
16
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relationships), Oregon law requires the court to examine the 
particular facts of each case and determine whether “the parties 
construct[ed] an essentially fiduciary-type relationship” such that 
“the party who owe[d] the duty has a special responsibility toward 
the other party.”76  Using this framework, Oregon courts have 
found protected special relationships to exist, for example, 
between a patient and his doctor performing an MRI scan77 and 
between a twenty-four-hour boarding school and a suicidal 
student.78 
Iowa law focuses on the emotional nature of the relationship 
to determine whether it qualifies as a special relationship.  
Accordingly, there is a duty to avoid emotional distress where the 
defendant performs an act that is 
so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, 
or with the sensibilities of the party to whom the duty is 
owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or 
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering, and it 
should be known to the parties from the nature of the 
[obligation] that such suffering will result from its 
breach.79 
The Iowa Supreme Court has further explained that foreseeability 
is an “important factor for consideration in the determination of 
the existence of a duty.”80  Using this framework, Iowa courts have 
 
 76. Shin, 111 P.3d at 771 (citation omitted); see also Strader v. Grange Mut. 
Ins. Co., 39 P.3d 903, 906 (Or. 2002) (“[T]he cases establish a functional as 
opposed to a formal analysis in determining whether the special relationship 
exists; in other words, the crucial aspect of the relationship is not its name, but the 
roles that the parties assume in the particular interaction where the alleged tort 
and breach of contract occur.”). 
 77. Curtis v. MRI Imaging Servs.II, 956 P.2d 960, 963 (Or. 1998).  The 
plaintiff in Curtis stated a valid cause of action by alleging that “the defendants 
were medical professionals who owed a duty to plaintiff to identify and guard 
against predictable psychological reactions or consequences—including 
claustrophobic reactions—to the MRI procedure.”  Id. 
 78. Shin, 111 P.3d at 773.  The standard of care that the court identified 
required a “reasonably prudent boarding school-surrogate parent [to] recognize[] 
the possibility of grave emotional distress as a concern associated with handling a 
suicidal teenage student in the school’s custody and dictates that certain 
precautions be taken to avoid or minimize such risks.”  Id. at 772.  
 79. Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 921 (Iowa 1976).  Iowa further 
requires that the degree of emotional distress suffered be “so severe that no 
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”  Bethards v. Shivvers, Inc., 355 
N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa 1984).   
 80. Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 422 (Iowa 1995) (citing Barnhill v. 
Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981)).   
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found special relationships to exist in actions involving the 
negligent delivery of a baby,81 the negligent delivery of a telegram 
announcing the death of a loved one,82 and the negligent 
performance of a contract to perform funeral services,83 but not for 
committing legal malpractice.84 
The Nevada Supreme Court recently concluded that two 
different defendants accused of committing the exact same act owe 
different duties because of the nature of the relationship involved.85  
In Boorman, either the defendant county coroner or the defendant 
mortuary lost a body’s internal organs.86  According to the Boorman 
court, “[u]nlike the duty of a county coroner . . . a mortuary 
voluntarily undertakes a duty to competently prepare the 
decedent’s body for the benefit of the bereaved.”87  Accordingly, 
“close family members who are aware of both the death of a loved 
one and that mortuary services were being performed may bring an 
action for emotional distress resulting from the negligent handling 
of the deceased’s remains” against a mortuary.88  A county coroner, 
however, “is obligated by law to perform [those] services,” “does 
not create a special relationship,” and does not “undertake any 
particular duty to the bereaved to prepare the deceased’s body for 
funeral services.”89 Accordingly, a county coroner only has a duty to 
“the person with the right to dispose of the deceased’s body for 
negligently handling a deceased person’s remains.”90 
 
 
 81. Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa 1990).  The Oswald court 
suggested that negligent delivery cases will almost always support a duty to avoid 
inflicting emotional distress.  Id.  (“As we observed by way of analogy in Meyer, the 
birth of a child involves a matter of life and death evoking such ‘mental concern 
and solicitude’ that the breach of a contract incident thereto ‘will inevitably result 
in mental anguish, pain and suffering.’” (quoting Meyer, 241 N.W.2d at 920)).   
 82. Cowan v. W. Union Tel. Co., 98 N.W. 281, 282–84 (Iowa 1904). 
 83. Meyer, 241 N.W.2d at 920–21. 
 84. Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d at 423.  The court reasoned that (1) legal work “is 
not so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the feelings 
of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or 
reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering;” and (2) “the claimed emotional 
distress is too far removed from the defendants’ negligent conduct to cause the 
imposition of a duty and does not naturally ensue from the acts complained of.”  
Id. (internal quotation omitted).   
 85. Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8–9 (Nev. 2010). 
 86. Id. at 6. 
 87. Id. at 7. 
 88. Id. at 8. 
 89. Id. at 9.   
 90. Id. 
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Some courts have attempted to more clearly define the 
parameters of a “special” or “preexisting” relationship by using 
what essentially amounts to a negligence per se analysis.  In Clomon 
v. Monroe City School Board,91 the Louisiana Supreme Court framed 
the independent duty rule as “permitting recovery for emotional 
distress from a tortfeasor who owed the plaintiff a special, direct 
duty created by law, contract or special relationship.”92  The 
plaintiff, a motorist who struck and killed a four-year-old child who 
had just exited a school bus, sued the bus driver and school board 
for the driver’s negligent failure to “await the safe passage of the 
child and to refrain from prematurely deactivating the signals or 
resuming her trip” in violation of Louisiana statute.93  While not 
expressly defining the scope or limitations on what constitutes a 
“special, direct duty,” the court suggested that any statutory 
violation satisfying the requirements of a negligence per se analysis 
would qualify.94  In addition, although the court did not make 
foreseeability an express requirement, it noted that a bus driver 
who breaches the statutory duty to keep bus signals on until exiting 
children reach safety could reasonably foresee that a passing 
motorist may strike a child and suffer resulting emotional distress.95   
Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court found legislative intent 
important in allowing recovery for emotional distress “under the 
theory that there has been a breach of fiduciary duty arising from 
the very special psychotherapist-patient confidential relationship 
recognized and created under section 491.0147 of the Florida 
Statutes.”96  That statute required psychotherapists to keep the 
 
 91. 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990). 
 92. Id. at 575. 
 93. Id. at 577. 
 94. See id. at 576 (“To determine whether Sonya established that the school 
board employees owed her a special, direct duty that they breached, entitling her 
to recover emotional distress damages caused by the violations, we follow a 
method similar to that of determining whether a defendant may be held liable in a 
negligence case on the basis of his violation of a statute.”).  As to how a passing 
motorist is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, the 
court broadly recognized that “the motorist is required and entitled to rely for his 
safety, convenience and peace of mind upon the bus driver’s performance of his 
duty to activate highly visible signals, await the child’s safe passage and remain as a 
stationary sentinel until the child’s security is clearly assured.”  Id. at 578. 
 95. Id. at 578 (“It is obvious that the bus driver’s dereliction may result in 
minimal to extreme consequences for the motorist including his fright at a near 
miss, his own physical injury or property damage, or his serious emotional and 
mental illness associated with a child’s injury or death . . . .”).    
 96. Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 352 (Fla. 2002).  The court also found it 
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substance of patient communications confidential.97  Without 
defining the scope of this special relationship exception to 
Florida’s traditional impact rule, the court held that a married 
couple could recover for emotional distress resulting from their 
marital counselor revealing “confidential information which the 
other spouse had told him in their private sessions.”98  A New York 
court also recognized the validity of a similar NIED claim against a 
psychotherapist after emphasizing the fiduciary and confidential 
nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and acknowledging that 
“the several statutes and regulations requiring physicians to protect 
the confidentiality of information gained during treatment are 
clear evidence of the public policy of New York.”99   
Finally, a relatively early Maine court decision made explicit 
what is implicit in each of these other decisions; that is, the nature 
of, and circumstances surrounding, certain special relationships 
make the traditional rationales for NIED denying recovery 
inapplicable: 
The rationale for requiring an independently actionable 
tort is that absent either tactile contact or the usual indicia 
of harm, no objective evidence exists that the defendant’s 
negligence actually has caused the plaintiff to suffer 
emotional distress.  There is little likelihood, however, 
that objective evidence of mental distress will be 
unavailable in a claim by a patient against his 
psychotherapist. Given the fact that a therapist undertakes 
the treatment of a patient’s mental problems and that the 
patient is encouraged to divulge his innermost thoughts, 
the patient is extremely vulnerable to mental harm if the 
therapist fails to adhere to the standards of care 
recognized by the profession.  Any psychological harm 
that may result from such negligence is neither 
speculative nor easily feigned.  Unlike evidence of mental 
distress occurring in other situations, objective proof of 
the existence vel non of a psychological injury in these 
 
important that the legislature has “declared for the people of Florida that 
‘emotional survival is equal in importance to physical survival.’”  Id. (quoting FLA. 
STAT. § 491.002 (2001)).    
 97. FLA. STAT. § 491.0147 (1997).  Florida generally follows the “impact rule,” 
but the court held that “under the particular facts of the case before us,” this rule 
did not accommodate the intent and purpose of section 491.0147.  Gracey, 837 So. 
2d at 351, 355, 358. 
 98. Id. at 351. 
 99. MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
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circumstances should not be difficult to obtain.  As this 
case illustrates, the severity of such an injury can be 
medically significant and objectively supportable.  We 
therefore conclude that the reasons for precluding 
recovery for mental distress are not cogent here.100 
Rowe involved a defendant who provided psychotherapy to 
both the plaintiff and a woman with whom the plaintiff was 
romantically involved.101  After a few months, the defendant 
allegedly terminated therapy with the plaintiff because she had 
developed “some emotional feelings” toward the plaintiff’s partner, 
which later developed into a romantic relationship.102  The plaintiff 
presented testimony that the defendant “failed to adhere to the 
basic standards applicable to a psycho-therapist when she 
continued to treat the plaintiff after [the defendant] became 
involved in a relationship with the plaintiff’s primary 
companion.”103  Accordingly, the court held that the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship created a duty to avoid causing 
emotional distress.104 
3. The Categorical Approach 
Instead of trying to articulate a universal test applicable to all 
factual situations, the Third Restatement approaches the 
independent duty rule on a categorical basis:  
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious 
emotional disturbance to another is subject to liability to 
the other if the conduct: 
. . . .  
(b) occurs in the course of specified categories of 
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which 
negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious 
emotional disturbance.105 
 
 
 100. Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 806–07 (Me. 1986).   
 101. Id. at 803. 
 102. Id. at 803–04. 
 103. Id. at 804.     
 104. See id. (“Accordingly Bennett, as a qualified social worker who undertook 
treatment of the plaintiff, and DHRS, as Bennett’s employer and supervisor, were 
under a duty to provide care in accordance with the standards of practice 
applicable to similar professionals engaged in counseling and psychotherapy.”). 
 105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
46 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
21
Ehrich: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Case for an Indepen
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] INDEPENDENT DUTY RULE IN MINNESOTA 1423 
The Third Restatement identifies several categories of activities 
for which courts have traditionally allowed recovery, but declines to 
take a position on which specific activities, undertakings, or 
relationships should support a duty.106  While the Third 
Restatement does not offer guidelines for determining when 
categories are appropriate for protection, it does observe that 
independent duty cases generally involve an undertaking or 
relationship “in which serious emotional harm is likely or where 
one person is in a position of power or authority over the other and 
therefore has greater potential to inflict emotional harm.”107  In this 
regard, the Third Restatement seems to be endorsing the general 
policy considerations underlying the special relationship approach, 
while acknowledging that a single test for determining the 
existence of a special relationship has not yet been satisfactorily 
annunciated.108  The Third Restatement further acknowledges what 
the preceding summary of cases demonstrate: (1) this is a 
developing area of law;109 (2) “[c]ourts have not provided clear 
guidelines to identify precisely which activities, undertakings, or 
relationships will support liability;”110 and (3) there is little 
consensus among courts on how to identify proper categories.111   
The Third Restatement’s position on the duty element in 
emotional distress cases is essentially the inverse of its position on 
the duty element in cases involving physical injury.  According to 
section 7(a), “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical 
harm.”112  Under this rule, courts generally “need not concern 
themselves with the existence or content of this ordinary duty”113 on 
a case-by-case basis as long as the actor’s conduct created a risk of 
 
 106. Id. at cmt. d.  The comment highlights cases involving erroneous death 
notifications, mishandling of a corpse or body remains, consumption of food 
contaminated with “repulsive foreign objects,” negligent childbirth, and 
misdiagnosis of a serious disease.  Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. See id. at cmt. f.  The comments to Section 46(b) specifically reject the 
foreseeability approach for its overbreadth.  See id.  For example, they illustrate 
why foreseeability alone is undesirable: “[A] doctor who negligently (and 
incorrectly) diagnoses a popular movie star or professional athlete as having 
terminal cancer is not liable to the star’s fans who suffer emotional disturbance 
upon hearing the diagnosis, even though such harm is clearly foreseeable.”  Id.  
 109. See id. at cmt. d. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. § 7(a) (2010). 
 113. Id. § 6 cmt. f.  
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physical harm.114  The narrow exception is where “an articulated 
countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting 
liability in a particular class of cases.”115  In such “exceptional cases,” 
the court should make a categorical exception “explained and 
justified based on articulated policies or principles that justify 
exempting [such] actors from liability or modifying the ordinary 
duty of reasonable care.”116  In emotional distress cases, however, 
section 47(b) embraces a general rule that there is no duty to avoid 
negligently inflicting emotional distress on others, but courts are 
allowed to make categorical exceptions where public policy 
considerations justify imposing liability.117   
Although few cases have overtly adopted the categorical 
approach, the rationales provided in several cases clearly indicate 
that is what the courts were doing.  For instance, in La Fleur v. 
Mosher,118 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that, although 
there is generally no duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional 
distress, an exception should be made for negligent confinement 
cases because the tort “by its very nature has the special likelihood 
of causing real and severe emotional distress.”119  The court went on 
to explain that: 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. § 7(b).  The Third Restatement provides several examples of where 
courts have identified important public policy considerations opposing the 
existence of a duty, including cases where courts held that (1) mothers owe no 
duty to their unborn fetuses; (2) physicians owe no duty to third parties; (3) social 
hosts who serve liquor owe no duty to third parties injured by their guests; and (4) 
certain media defendants owe no duty to protect the public from physical harm 
due to publishing material such as video games, books, and movies.  Id. at cmts. c, 
d & cmt. e reporters’ note. 
 116. Id. at cmt. j.   
 117. See id. § 46 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“[T]he rules stated in this 
Section and in § 47 are exceptions to a general rule that negligently caused pure 
emotional disturbance is not recoverable even when it is foreseeable.”).   
 118. 325 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1982). 
 119. Id. at 317.  That is not to say, however, that Wisconsin’s categorical 
exception means a duty will be imposed every time that a defendant’s conduct falls 
within a recognized category.  The La Fleur court went on to hold that plaintiffs 
with a negligent confinement action must prove five factors: 
(1)  The defendant must have been negligent in confining the plaintiff. 
(2)  The confinement must be for a substantial period of time. 
(3)  The circumstances surrounding the confinement must be such that a 
reasonably constituted person would be emotionally harmed. 
(4)  The confinement must be a substantial factor in causing the 
emotional distress. 
(5)  The resulting emotional distress must be severe. 
Id. at 318.   
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By the very fact of confinement, under facts like those set 
forth here, a person’s right to be free from bodily 
restraint is infringed.  This deprivation of liberty alone, 
when it causes serious emotional distress, is a wrong 
sufficiently worthy of redress that the physical injury 
requirement should not be necessary.  When there is a 
substantial and unwarranted deprivation of liberty, that 
deprivation itself is a sufficient guarantee that the claim is 
not frivolous and that it is more probable that the plaintiff 
did, in fact, suffer the emotional distress alleged.  It is the 
very nature of confinement that creates the likelihood of 
emotional injury.  Emotional harm, in the appropriate 
circumstances, is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
negligent confinement.120 
It is unclear whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court will use this 
analysis to create other categorical exceptions.121 
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted negligent 
mishandling of corpses as a narrow exception to the general rule of 
no recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress.122  The only 
rationale provided was the long history of courts recognizing a 
“‘quasi-property’ right in the survivors to control the disposition of 
a loved one’s remains.”123 
The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized the flexibility of 
the categorical approach, noting that “the law of mental anguish 
damages is rooted in societal judgments, some no longer current, 
about the gravity of certain wrongs and their likely effects.”124  The 
categorical approach, according to the court, arose in part out of 
the impossibility of “distilling a unified theory of mental anguish,”125 
but recognized “that there are some categories of cases in which 
the problems of foreseeability and genuineness are sufficiently 
mitigated that the law should allow recovery for anguish.”126  The 
only categories that the court mentioned were “intentional or 
 
 120. Id. at 317–18 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court cited foreseeability as a public policy factor supporting a categorical 
exception, not as a stand-alone basis to impose a duty.  Id. at 318.   
 121. See M.M.H. v. United States, 966 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining 
to speculate whether Wisconsin would expand La Fleur). 
 122. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 462–63 (W. 
Va. 1985). 
 123. Id. at 460–61. 
 124. City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Tex. 1997). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 495. 
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malicious conduct such as libel” and “violations of certain statutes 
such as the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”127  It declined to adopt a 
new category for the flooding of one’s home and destruction of 
personal items.128 
Absent from the foregoing authorities is any useful framework 
for determining when a particular category should be recognized.  
This absence exposes these decisions to criticism for being result-
oriented and generating unpredictability and uncertainty.  Several 
jurisdictions attempt to address these problems by using a multi-
factor test that takes into account 
(1)The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 
(2)The degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury; 
(3)The closeness of the connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; 
(4)The moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; 
(5)The policy of preventing future harm; 
(6)The extent of the burden to the defendant; 
(7)The consequences to the community of imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; 
and  
(8)The availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for 
the risk involved.129 
Applying this test, courts have found an independent duty to 
exist in categories of cases involving babies switched at birth130 and 
babies injured during delivery,131 but declined to recognize an 
independent duty in categories of cases involving product 
manufacturers that fail to warn strict ethical vegans of the presence 
of animal products in their products132 and defendants who 
negligently place the plaintiff in a position to unknowingly harm a 
 
 127. Id. (citations omitted). 
 128. Id. at 496–97.  The court reasoned that not everyone suffering this injury 
would be likely to suffer emotional distress or feel undercompensated by receiving 
the monetary value of their destroyed property.  Id. at 497. 
 129. Friedman v. Merck & Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 891 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); accord Kallstrom v. 
United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167 n.24 (Alaska 2002) (citing D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. 
Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1981)); Burgess v. Superior 
Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1205 (Cal. 1992); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 
203–04 (Wyo. 2003). 
 130. Larsen, 81 P.3d at 206–07.   
 131. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1205.   
 132. Friedman, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892. 
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third party.133  More can be gleaned from the cases that reject an 
independent duty using this balancing test than those that 
recognize one.   
For instance, the defendant in Friedman negligently 
misrepresented to the plaintiff that a tuberculosis test was “vegan 
safe,” meaning it contained no animal byproducts.134  The plaintiff 
commenced suit when he discovered that the test actually involved 
injecting him with bovine (cow) serum, which offended his ethical 
belief that animals should not be exploited for any purpose and 
allegedly caused him emotional distress.135  The court found it 
dispositive that its task was 
[N]ot to decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was 
reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s 
conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether 
the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently 
likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that 
liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent 
party.136 
Because strict ethical vegans do not constitute an “appreciable or 
substantial” portion of the population, the court determined that 
“public policy does not support the imposition of a duty to warn or 
advise.”137 
Moving from cases where the class size is too small, an Alaska 
decision illustrates how a class size can be too large.  The defendant 
in Kallstrom negligently allowed someone to leave a pitcher of lye-
based caustic detergent near a kitchen sink.138  Believing the pitcher 
contained fruit juice, the plaintiff poured a cup for a child to drink, 
which caused the child severe internal injuries.139  The plaintiff 
brought suit for the emotional distress she suffered in knowing that 
she harmed the child.140  Because the “[f]actual circumstances 
creating the participant or unwitting instrument scenario can vary 
so widely,” the court was concerned that such a classification did 
 
 133. Kallstrom, 43 P.3d at 168. 
 134. Friedman, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888–89. 
 135. Id. at 889. 
 136. Id. at 891 (citing Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 629 n.6 (Cal. 1986)). 
 137. Id. at 892, 894.  The court cited a long line of cases for the proposition 
“that there is no duty to warn of the possibility of rare, idiosyncratic, 
hypersensitive, or unusual reactions to an otherwise safe and useful product.”  Id. 
at 892. 
 138. Kallstrom, 43 P.3d at 164. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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not provide “a sufficient guarantee that the claim is neither false 
nor insubstantial.”141  The court explained how the breadth of the 
proposed category undermined the “first and most important 
factor, foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff”: 
We can imagine a potentially endless variety of factual 
circumstances that may give rise to an unwitting 
instrument claim: the friend who mails a defective toy to a 
child who later chokes on a small part of the toy, the 
owner who lends his car to a friend unaware that the car 
has faulty brakes, the cook whose customers develop a 
disease ten years after he served them food containing a 
carcinogenic preservative, and the driver who sues parents 
for negligent supervision after hitting a child who chases a 
ball into the street.  Although all might be labeled 
“unwitting instruments,” these scenarios vary widely with 
regard to the relevant considerations of duty, including 
foreseeability, certainty of injury, and ability to prevent 
future harm.142 
The court went on to cite other potentially problematic variables 
inherent in this type of category, including “the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the victim, the nature of the participant’s 
involvement, and the uncertain mix of potential emotions, 
including guilt, shock or indifference.”143  
IV. A CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT DUTY RULE IN MINNESOTA 
A. Suitability of an Independent Duty Rule Under Minnesota Law 
While the Minnesota Supreme Court has been reluctant “to 
expand the availability of damages for emotional distress,”144 it has 
endorsed recovery where “the emotional injury occurred under 
circumstances tending to guarantee its genuineness.”145  Minnesota 
law thus does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of recognizing 
a narrowly tailored independent duty to avoid negligently inflicting 
emotional distress.146   
 
 141. Id. at 167. 
 142. Id. (citing D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 
555 (Alaska 1981)). 
 143. Id. at 168.  
 144. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560 
(Minn. 1996).    
 145. Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn. 1983).   
 146. See also Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in 
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Neither the special relationship nor the foreseeability 
formulations of the independent duty rule, however, appear to 
satisfy the criteria for NIED recovery in Minnesota.  When 
formulating rules for NIED recovery, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has emphasized the need for a bright-line test that is 
“workable, reasonable, logical and just as possible.”147  An objective 
test is “necessary to ensure stability and predictability in the 
disposition of emotional distress claims.”148  None of the foreign 
decisions falling within the special relationship approach have 
successfully outlined a useful test for determining when a 
qualifying special relationship exists, let alone articulated a bright-
line rule.149  And the Minnesota Supreme Court has already 
rejected a similar version of the foreseeability test for bystander 
recovery, criticizing it as being too subjective, too expansive, and 
not conducive to a precise definition.150  Many courts from other 
 
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1993).  After discussing Minnesota’s 
NIED decisions, Professor Steenson discusses the special relationship rule 
announced in Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992), and notes 
that “the possibility still exists for the Minnesota Supreme Court to adopt the 
Burgess approach, even if it adheres to the basic zone of danger/physical 
formulation as the standard for resolving negligent infliction of emotional distress 
cases.”  Steenson, supra, at 31.  He concludes that if Minnesota courts liberalize the 
zone of danger requirement in “direct victim” cases such as Burgess, courts would 
be permitted “to analyze the issue of whether recovery should be granted by using 
the same policy factors used to analyze duty cases in general.”  Id. at 22.   
 147. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980).  The Stadler court 
explained that “[i]f the limits cannot be consistently and meaningfully applied by 
courts and juries, then the imposition of liability would become arbitrary and 
capricious,” and “the cause of just apportionment of the losses would suffer.”  Id. 
at 554. 
 148. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 1995).  The plaintiff in 
K.A.C. was exposed to a risk of AIDS when the defendant performed two 
gynecological procedures on her while he was infected with HIV.  Id. at 555.  The 
court held that a mere fear of exposure failed to satisfy the zone of danger 
requirement because it would impart subjectivity into the analysis.  Id. at 559.    
 149. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 150. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 770 n.3 (Minn. 2005); 
Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 554–55.  According to the Engler court, bystander tests in 
other jurisdictions fall into three categories: (1) the impact rule; (2) the zone of 
danger test; and (3) the foreseeable bystander test.  Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 768.  
The foreseeable bystander test allows recovery where “‘the plaintiff: (1) is closely 
related to the [third-party] victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-
producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to 
the victim’; and ‘(3) as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which would 
be anticipated in a disinterested witness.’”  Id. at 769 n.2 (quoting Thing v. La 
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989)).  Stadler expressly rejected this test.  Stadler, 
295 N.W.2d at 554–55.  The Engler court observed that some jurisdictions have 
adopted a variation of this test that looks solely to the foreseeability of the harm.  
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jurisdictions have also soundly criticized the foreseeability 
approach for its vagueness, unpredictability, and subjectivity.151 
The categorical approach, on the other hand, is more 
cautious, far less arbitrary than the existing limits on NIED 
recovery, and can be as narrow as courts wish to make it.  Further, 
once qualifying categories are adopted, the approach results in 
objective, bright-line rules that are easy to apply.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the categorical approach is more consistent with 
Minnesota’s direct invasion exception and better serves to 
reconcile cases that have allowed recovery with those that have not.  
An examination of the roots and evolution of Minnesota’s direct 
invasion exception illuminates these advantages.   
B. The Tortured Evolution of Minnesota’s Direct Invasion Exception 
In the seminal 1891 decision, Larson v. Chase,152 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court examined whether a woman could recover for 
“mental suffering and nervous shock” for the defendant’s “unlawful 
mutilation and dissection” of her husband’s body.153  The court first 
examined cases from other jurisdictions and concluded that “all 
courts now concur in holding that the right to the possession of a 
dead body for the purposes of decent burial belongs to those most 
intimately and closely connected with the deceased by domestic 
ties, and that this is a right which the law will recognize and 
 
Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 770 n.3.  Engler expressly rejected this test as being even 
more expansive because it “is not cabined by the imposition of mandatory 
elements, such as a close relationship or contemporaneous observation.”  Id. at 
770 n.3.   
 151. E.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 826 (“[I]t is clear that foreseeability of the injury 
alone is not a useful ‘guideline’ or a meaningful restriction on the scope of the 
NIED action.”); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 443 (Tenn. 1996) (“[The 
foreseeability approach] provides little, if any, concrete guidelines for trial courts 
and juries to use in deciding how each case should be resolved.”); Boyles v. Kerr, 
855 S.W.2d 593, 599–600 (Tex. 1993) (“[The foreseeability] standard, however, 
fails to delineate meaningfully those situations where recovery should be 
allowed.”); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986) (“Unfortunately 
[the foreseeability] test is so vague that it has little practical value.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46(b) 
cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“Instead of relying on foreseeability to 
identify appropriate cases for recovery, the policy issues surrounding specific 
categories of undertakings, activities, and relationships must be examined to 
determine whether, as a category, they merit inclusion among the exceptions to 
the general rule of no liability.”). 
 152. 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891). 
 153. Id. at 307, 50 N.W. at 238.   
29
Ehrich: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Case for an Indepen
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] INDEPENDENT DUTY RULE IN MINNESOTA 1431 
protect.”154  In holding that recovery for emotional distress is 
permitted under these circumstances, the court broadly declared 
that “where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement on a legal 
right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is the direct, 
proximate, and natural result of the wrongful act.”155  The court did 
not limit this proclamation to willful or wanton conduct.156 
In Bucknam v. Great Northern Railway Co.,157 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court emphasized that Larson is limited to situations 
involving a direct violation of an underlying legal interest.158  The 
plaintiff sought recovery for emotional distress because she had 
witnessed the defendant use “harsh, violent, and abusive language, 
and ma[k]e threatening and insulting demands of and towards 
plaintiff’s husband.”159  The court quickly dispensed with her 
argument because she was not able to identify “any infraction of 
her legal right.”160  The court further explained that: 
Many vexatious, annoying, and humiliating things 
frequently occur in every community that are not 
actionable.  Such things may affect those peculiarly 
sensitive, while to others they would seem only a matter of 
indifference.  The latter, unaffected thereby, could not 
maintain an action for a personal wrong; and, if the 
former should be permitted to do so, we should have 
litigated a question of comparative nervousness and 
sensitiveness as an element of damages, and the courts 
burdened with vexatious litigation where there was 
neither slander, physical injury, negligence, or intent to 
injure or frighten a third person, and where the 
defendant might be entirely unaware of the physical 
condition of the person so alleged to be injured.161 
 
 
 
 154. Id. at 309, 50 N.W. at 238–39. 
 155. Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239–40.   
 156. See id.  The opinion does not describe enough facts to understand the 
level of the defendant’s culpability.  The fact that he was accused of “mutilation” 
and “dissection” is suggestive of morbid intentional misconduct, but it is equally 
possible the defendant was a mortician or coroner acting under the mistaken 
belief that an autopsy was authorized.  In either event, the court did not focus on 
the defendant’s culpability in any way in allowing recovery.  
 157. 76 Minn. 373, 79 N.W. 98 (1899). 
 158. Id. at 377, 79 N.W. at 99. 
 159. Id. at 376, 79 N.W. at 98.   
 160. Id. at 377, 79 N.W. at 99. 
 161. Id. 
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In 1894, the supreme court refused to extend Larson to allow 
recovery for mental suffering resulting from negligently failing to 
deliver a telegram.162  The plaintiff in Francis v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co. sent a telegram to his estranged wife asking if she 
wished to reconcile their marriage.163  When she did not respond, 
the plaintiff “concluded that she was unwilling to renew her 
marriage relations with him, and feared that all hope of 
reconciliation with her was at an end.”164  When the plaintiff 
discovered that his wife did not respond because she had never 
received the telegram, he brought suit claiming the telegraph 
company was responsible for causing his emotional distress.165   
Even though the defendant had violated a state statute in 
failing to transmit the telegram, and even though the statute 
specifically authorized the plaintiff to recover all actual damages 
sustained as a result of that failure, the supreme court 
characterized the gravamen of the action as being for a breach of 
contract, not a tort.166  Because the plaintiff’s action was not 
possible without the existence of a contract, the court limited the 
plaintiff to contract damages, which does not include damages for 
emotional distress.167  The court explained why emotional distress 
damages are disfavored: 
The law has always been exceedingly cautious in allowing 
damages for mental suffering, for the manifest reasons, 
among others, that such damages are more sentimental 
than substantial, depending largely upon temperament 
and physical and nervous condition.  The suffering of one 
under precisely the same circumstances would be no test 
of the suffering of another, and there being no possible 
standard by which such an injury can be even 
approximately measured, they are subject to many, if not 
most, of the objections to speculative damages which are 
universally excluded.  In no case will an action for 
damages lie for mental suffering caused by an act which, 
however wrongful, infringes no legal right of the party.168  
 
 
 162. Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 266, 59 N.W. 1078, 1082 
(1894).   
 163. Id. at 258, 59 N.W. at 1078. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 261, 59 N.W. at 1080. 
 167. See id. at 261–64, 59 N.W. at 1080–81.  
 168. Id. at 261–62, 59 N.W. at 1080. 
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The court then distinguished Larson as involving: (1) a willful tort, 
not a pure contract action; and (2) circumstances that “naturally 
and necessarily [tend] to injure the feelings.”169 
In Lindh v. Great Northern Railway Co.,170 the court shifted its 
focus back to the plaintiff’s legal interest, and cited Larson as being 
dispositive to the question of whether a widow could recover for 
her emotional distress resulting from the defendant “carelessly and 
negligently” leaving his dead wife’s coffin exposed to rain while 
transporting it in a railroad truck.171  The opinion also mentions 
that the defendant “willfully ignored the request of the plaintiff to 
place the truck under cover,”172 but does not mention the 
defendant’s culpability as being important or even relevant to the 
outcome.173  Instead, the court hinted for the first time that the 
nature of the undertaking (i.e., handling dead bodies) imparted 
some inherent reliability to an allegation of emotional distress: 
“Injury to the feelings of the family of deceased spring as naturally 
from disfiguration and mutilation of the body by exposure to the 
elements as by dissection.”174  The decision does not cite Francis or 
make any distinction between pure contract actions and actions for 
willful torts.   
One year after Lindh, the court again shifted the focus back to 
the Francis court’s contract/tort distinction.  Like Larson and Lindh, 
Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway Co.,175 involved a rail carrier 
delivering a damaged corpse, but with one important distinction.  
Instead of the rail carrier causing the damage, it neglected to 
unload the body at the proper station, which delayed the funeral 
 
 169. Id. at 262, 59 N.W. at 1080.  The court later suggested that it is never 
proper in pure breach of contract actions (i.e., contract actions that do not involve 
willful conduct) to distinguish between contracts that are merely pecuniary in 
nature, and those that are emotional in nature.  Id. at 264, 59 N.W. at 1081.  The 
court emphasized the danger of creating a slippery slope if mental distress 
damages were allowed in certain breach of contract actions but not others.  See id. 
 170. 99 Minn. 408, 109 N.W. 823 (1906). 
 171. Id. at 408, 109 N.W. at 823–24. 
 172. Id. at 408, 109 N.W. at 823.   
 173. See id. at 408–10, 109 N.W. at 823–24.  Nor did the court mention the fact 
that the plaintiff could not have proved her case without the existence of an 
underlying contractual obligation to ship the corpse, a consideration that the 
Francis court found dispositive.  See id.     
 174. Id. at 409, 109 N.W. at 824.  In mentioning “exposure” and “dissection,” 
the court was referring to the facts of the case (exposing the corpse to the 
elements) and the facts in Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 308, 50 N.W. 238, 238 
(1891) (dissecting the body). 
 175. 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907). 
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for twenty-four hours and gave the corpse additional time to decay 
naturally.176  The court began by observing generally that emotional 
distress damages are “limited to actions where the plaintiff has 
received some injury to his person, or some legal right has been 
invaded of a nature naturally to cause grief and distress of mind.”177  
But the court went on to explain that this rule only applies to tort 
actions, and that failing to timely deliver a corpse to a funeral, 
without more, was really just a breach of contract.178  Accordingly, if 
an action is based purely upon a breach of contract, the plaintiff 
has to show that the breach was willful in order to recover damages 
for emotional distress.179  The court distinguished Larson and Lindh 
as both involving willful conduct.180 
In 1940, the supreme court transitioned back to focusing on 
the invasion of the plaintiff’s legal interest, again without 
mentioning the defendant’s culpability.  In Sworski v. Simons,181 an 
undertaker acting at the direction of the county coroner began 
embalming the plaintiff’s son’s body without his permission.182  
Relying heavily on Larson, the court focused on the plaintiff’s legal 
right to his son’s body and the accompanying right to determine 
who would perform the embalming, not on any willful or wanton 
misconduct by the defendant.183  The opinion makes no mention of 
any wrongful act other than negligence, and does not cite Francis or 
Beaulieu. 
Although seemingly inconsistent, these “direct invasion” 
decisions can be reconciled as allowing emotional distress damages 
in certain emotionally-charged tort actions and contract actions 
involving a willful breach.  In 1963, however, the supreme court in 
 
 176. Id. at 48, 114 N.W. at 353. 
 177. Id. at 49, 114 N.W. at 353. 
 178. See id. at 52–53, 114 N.W. at 355.  In an action for breach of contract, the 
court explained that the only recoverable damages are those “within the 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and which may be 
measured and determined by some definite rule or standard of compensation.”  
Id.  Because damages for emotional distress are “incapable of definite calculation,” 
they can be recovered in a breach of contract action only “in those exceptional 
cases where the breach amounts to an independent willful tort, in which event 
they may be recovered under proper allegations of malice, wantonness, or 
oppression.”  Id. 
 179. Id. at 55–56, 114 N.W. at 356. 
 180. Id.  
 181. 208 Minn. 201, 293 N.W. 309 (1940). 
 182. Id. at 203, 293 N.W. at 310. 
 183. See id. at 205, 293 N.W. at 311.   
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle,184 perhaps 
inadvertently blurred this distinction when attempting to 
summarize these decisions in a single sentence: 
It is well established that damages for mental anguish or 
suffering cannot be sustained where there has been no 
accompanying physical injury unless there has been some 
conduct on the part of [the] defendant constituting a 
direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that 
constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, 
seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious 
misconduct.185   
The result was a confusing and inaccurate synthesis of the direct 
invasion decisions that does not fully effectuate the Larson court’s 
holding that “where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement 
on a legal right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it is the 
direct, proximate and natural result of the wrongful act.”186   
In addition, the Village of Isle court’s characterization of the 
direct invasion exception was unnecessary for the outcome of the 
decision because the plaintiff only alleged a derivative injury 
(mental distress arising out of the death of another), not a direct 
invasion of her own legal interest.187  Accordingly, her emotional 
distress damages should have been denied summarily based upon 
Bucknam and Larson.188  In this regard, the Village of Isle court 
committed the same error that the Larson court chastised other 
courts for making: 
There has been a great deal of misconception and 
confusion as to when, if ever, mental suffering, as a 
distinct element of damage, is a subject for compensation. 
This has frequently resulted from courts giving a wrong 
reason for a correct conclusion that in a given case no 
 
 184. 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963). 
 185. Id. at 367–68, 122 N.W.2d at 41 (citations omitted). 
 186. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 311, 50 N.W. 238, 239–40 (1891). 
 187. See Village of Isle, 265 Minn. at 362, 122 N.W.2d at 38.  The court was 
analyzing whether a woman could recover emotional distress damages in a dram 
shop action for the loss of her husband.  Id.  
 188. Bucknam v. Great N. Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 373, 376–77, 79 N.W. 98, 98–99 
(1899) (denying recovery to a woman who witnessed the defendant using “harsh, 
violent and abusive language” towards her husband because the defendant did not 
invade her legal interest); Larson, 47 Minn. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239 (“It is 
unquestionably the law . . . that for the law to furnish redress there must be an act 
which, under the circumstances, is wrongful; and it must take effect upon the 
person, the property, or some other legal interest, of the party complaining.”) 
(quotation omitted)). 
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recovery could be had for mental suffering, placing it on 
the ground that mental suffering, as a distinct element of 
damage, is never a proper subject of compensation, when 
the correct ground was that the act complained of was not 
an infraction of any legal right, and hence not an 
actionable wrong at all . . . .189 
The problem created by Village of Isle came full circle when the 
plaintiff in Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A.,190 
asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to allow her to recover 
emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice action.191  
Because legal malpractice is a hybrid tort/contract action, the 
court could not just cite Beaulieu and Francis as authority that willful 
conduct is a prerequisite to recovery in pure breach of contract 
actions.192  Unwilling to recognize that all legal malpractice actions 
should give rise to recovery of damages for emotional distress, the 
court cited the dicta in Village of Isle as authority for requiring a 
showing of willful misconduct, even in negligence actions.193  Ever 
since, courts have struggled with applying Lickteig and Village of Isle 
in direct invasion cases.194  
As demonstrated, the focus for emotional distress recovery has 
inexplicably shifted from the defendant’s invasion of the plaintiff’s 
legal interest in a highly emotional undertaking, to almost entirely 
the defendant’s culpability when invading the legal interest.  This 
evolution is inconsistent with Larson and Sworski, which do not rely 
in any way on the defendant’s culpability and, in fact, appear to 
have involved purely negligent conduct.195  It also fails to appreciate 
 
 189. Larson, 47 Minn. at 311, 50 N.W. at 239. 
 190. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996). 
 191. Id. at 560.  
 192. See id. at 561 (“Our analysis is complicated by the hybrid nature of claims 
for legal malpractice.”). 
 193. Id. at 560–62 (“There must be a direct violation of the plaintiff’s rights by 
willful, wanton or malicious conduct; mere negligence is not sufficient.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Gooch v. N. Country Reg’l Hosp., No. A05-576, 2006 WL 771384, 
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006) (“It is unclear in Minnesota . . . whether a 
claim for wrongful interference with a dead body can be supported by a showing 
of mere negligence, or whether it requires a showing of willful or wanton 
misconduct similar to an NIED case.”); Schmidt v. HealthEast, No. C1-96-152, 1996 
WL 310032, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 11, 1996) (citing Village of Isle and 
suggesting the direct invasion exception also requires proof that the plaintiff was 
in the zone of danger); Kamrath v. Suburban Nat’l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 111–12 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citing the direct invasion exception as informing the IIED 
analysis). 
 195. See Sworski v. Simons, 208 Minn. 201, 203, 293 N.W. 309, 310 (1940); 
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 311, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891). 
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the original purpose of the willfulness requirement, which was to 
distinguish between pure breach of contract actions and contract 
actions involving an independent tort.196  And it is contradicted by 
the Beaulieu court’s recognition that emotional distress damages 
are recoverable in tort actions where a “legal right has been 
invaded of a nature naturally to cause grief and distress of mind.”197  
The categorical approach to the independent duty rule would 
allow courts to correct these inconsistencies. 
C. Redefining the Limits of NIED Recovery in Direct Invasion Cases 
Aside from its shaky foundation, the Lickteig court’s version of 
the direct invasion exception fails to advance the underlying 
purpose of granting exceptions to the general no duty rule—to 
ensure that only genuine claims of emotional distress reach the 
jury.198  It is difficult to comprehend how, for example, the spouse 
of a recently deceased is any less likely to suffer emotional distress 
upon discovering that her husband’s corpse was lost or mutilated 
due to negligent conduct, than if it were lost or mutilated due to 
reckless or willful conduct.  Likewise, a patient misdiagnosed with a 
terrible disease is no less likely to suffer emotional distress upon 
learning of the diagnosis than if he or she were to later find an 
expert willing to testify that the doctor made the diagnosis in 
reckless disregard of the truth with knowledge that injury could 
result.  In short, attempting to draw a line based on the defendant’s 
culpability is arbitrary, illogical, and inharmonious with the roots of 
the direct invasion exception.   
Reverting back to the Francis and Beaulieu courts’ strict 
contract/tort distinction is also unappealing.  The mere fact that 
the legal interest invaded originates from a common law standard 
of care rather than a contractual obligation does not ensure that 
the injury is genuine.  Moreover, as the dissenting justice in 
Beaulieu pointed out, distinguishing a tort action from a contract 
action based purely on whether the action involves an underlying 
contract 
 
 196. Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 261–62, 59 N.W. 1078, 1080 
(1894).   
 197. Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 49, 114 N.W. 353, 353 (1907). 
 198. See Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn. 1983) 
(“We have been careful to restrict the availability of such damages to those 
plaintiffs who prove that emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending 
to guarantee its genuineness.”). 
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[A]mounts to defining a tort as a wrong independent of 
contract.  The fallacy of that definition has been clearly 
and repeatedly demonstrated.  It is elementary that the 
distinction between contracts and torts is not 
philosophical, but historical, and largely concerns the law 
adjective. . . . 
In point of actual number, nine-tenths of the actions 
ex delicto heard by this court, and by most courts, involve 
causes of action which could not be maintained without 
pleading and proving the contract.199 
Since that time, of course, the contract/tort distinction has 
been further blurred or eliminated in many types of cases—such as 
strict products liability and professional malpractice—as a matter of 
public policy.200  The same policy considerations support removing 
this artificial distinction in certain breach of contract claims 
involving highly emotional subject matters.201   
 
 199. Beaulieu, 103 Minn. at 57–58, 114 N.W. at 357 (Jaggard, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Likewise, a year earlier, the Lindh court 
recognized that “[i]t is elementary ‘that a tort is a violation of legal duty and may 
involve as one of its elements a breach of contract.’”  Lindh v. Great N. Ry. Co., 99 
Minn. 408, 409, 109 N.W. 823, 824 (1906) (quoting Rich v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson 
River R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382 (1882)). 
 200. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn. 
1992) (“Although strict liability is a tort, it is really a stripped-down model of a 
breach of warranty claim, with the result that the two remedies frequently 
overlap.”); Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) 
(implying that legal malpractice does not fit nicely into either a breach of contract 
claim or tort claim).     
 201. See Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) 
(“Although the general rule in Alabama is that mental anguish is not a recoverable 
element of damages in an action for breach of contract, an exception to this rule . 
. . has been recognized by this Court: Where the contractual duty or obligation is 
so coupled with matters of mental concern or solitude . . . that a breach will 
necessarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering . . . .” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & 
Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 93 (N.C. 1990) (“[T]he contractual 
relationship provides a strong factual basis to support either a claim for emotional 
distress based upon a breach of the contract or a finding of proximate causation 
and foreseeability of injury sufficient to establish a tort claim for emotional 
distress.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 46 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“A court might hold that, although 
damages for emotional disturbance normally are not recoverable for breach of 
contract, some contracts—such as burial contracts—are so intimately tied to 
emotional issues that they call for an exception to the general rule.”).  The Third 
Restatement further recognizes that liability under the independent duty rule “can 
sometimes be explained as an appendage to contract law” and encourages courts 
to “be cognizant of the close relationships between tort and contract in these cases 
to ensure that the rules in each area are compatible.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
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Like the supreme court’s early direct invasion decisions, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals has more recently observed that the 
direct invasion exception typically involves tort where the very 
nature of the legal interest invaded tends to “naturally and directly 
cause emotional distress.”202  As a substantial number of other 
jurisdictions have implicitly recognized, this observation is no less 
true when those legal interests are invaded through purely 
negligent conduct, such as misdiagnosing serious diseases, 
mishandling corpses, committing psychological malpractice, and 
giving erroneous death notifications.203  Thus, focusing back on the 
emotional nature of the legal interest invaded, as opposed to the 
defendant’s culpability, is how the duty analysis should be guided 
in future cases.   
Concededly, merely asking whether the legal interest invaded 
tends to directly and naturally lead to emotional distress is far from 
a bright-line rule.  But at the same time, no court to date has 
succeeded in reducing societal values into a single, all-inclusive rule 
that strikes an appropriate balance between weeding out frivolous 
emotional distress claims and compensating legitimate injuries for 
every fact pattern that could present itself.204  Accordingly, the 
Third Restatement’s approach of allowing judges to define narrow, 
 
 202. Carlson v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 534, 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994); see also Beaulieu, 103 Minn. at 49, 114 N.W. at 353 (observing that emotional 
distress damages are “limited to actions where the plaintiff has received some 
injury to his person, or some legal right has been invaded of a nature naturally to 
cause grief and distress of mind.”); Lindh, 99 Minn. at 409, 109 N.W. at 824 (1906) 
(“Injury to the feelings of the family of deceased spring as naturally from 
disfiguration and mutilation of the body by exposure to the elements as by 
dissection.”). 
 203. See supra Part III.B.1–3 (summarizing cases from fifteen different 
jurisdictions allowing recovery for emotional distress without regard to the 
defendant’s culpability). 
 204. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 
(Me. 1987) (“[Our prior cases] also demonstrate the frailty of supposed lines of 
demarcation when they are subjected to judicial scrutiny in the context of varying 
fact patterns.”); Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 424 
(Mont. 1995) (“As is readily apparent, the case law demonstrates that negligent 
infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort action is a thorny issue with 
which this Court has struggled.”); City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 496 (Tex. 
1997) (“Our opinion today does not attempt the perhaps impossible task of 
distilling a unified theory of mental anguish from the existing precedents.”); W.E. 
Shipley, Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or Its Physical 
Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 103 
(1959), superseded by 38 A.L.R.4th 998 (“The case law in the field . . . is in an almost 
unparalleled state of confusion and any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the 
authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed perplexity.”).   
38
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/7
  
1440 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
policy-based categories of legal interests that are worthy of 
protection appears to be the most logical, fair, and harmonious way 
of redefining Minnesota’s direct invasion exception.   
Further, providing factors to guide the courts’ analysis 
eliminates some of the subjectivity inherent in the process of 
determining which categories qualify, while retaining the needed 
flexibility to respond to the different types of fact patterns that will 
transpire.  Once courts identify categories of protected legal 
interests, juries would have purely objective, bright-line tests to 
apply.205  If district courts are adopting overbroad categories, de 
novo appellate review is available to curtail the improper expansion 
of liability.   
The eight-factor test that the courts in Larson, Friedman, 
Kallstrom, and Burgess applied is a start, but can be improved.206  In 
Rowland v. Christian,207 the California Supreme Court originally 
designed that test for the very different purpose of determining 
whether a specific category of conduct should be excluded from 
the general rule in physical injury cases imposing a duty whenever 
the actor increased the risk of harm.208  Thus, the objective in the 
Rowland analysis is to determine whether strong public policy 
considerations against imposing liability override the general policy 
of providing compensation for physical injuries.209  The overarching 
goal in NIED cases, however, is to identify categories of legal 
interests that, when invaded, tend to directly and naturally cause 
 
 205. See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980) (recognizing that 
the zone of danger rule provides an objective guide for a jury to determine).  As 
with bystander recovery, each category of protected legal interests must also 
include the class of plaintiffs with standing to pursue recovery.  For example, 
simply identifying preserving a corpse is not helpful unless the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the deceased were limited to, for example, spouses, 
parents, children, and siblings of the deceased who actually observed the body’s 
mutilated condition. 
 206. See supra Part III.B.3 and note 129. 
 207. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
 208. See id. at 564, superseded by statute in part on other grounds, CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1714.7 (West 2009), as stated in Perez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
 209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7(a)–(b) (2010); see also supra notes 115–117 (noting the Third 
Restatement’s examples of situations where public policy considerations oppose 
recognizing a duty, including holdings that (1) mothers owe no duty to their 
unborn fetuses; (2) physicians owe no duty to third parties; (3) social hosts who 
serve liquor owe no duty to third parties injured by their guests; and (4) certain 
media defendants owe no duty to protect the public from physical harm due to 
publishing material such as video games, books, and movies). 
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emotional distress.210  Analyzing, for example, the availability and 
prevalence of insurance, the defendant’s moral blame, and the 
burden on the defendant does not serve this purpose.  The other 
Rowland factors can be modified slightly to better serve the goal of 
the duty analysis in NIED cases.  
D. Proposed Guidelines for Identifying Categories of Protected Activities 
Examining the considerations courts have cited as being 
important when imposing a duty in NIED cases can help develop a 
better set of guidelines.  Grouped loosely in order of importance, 
those guidelines follow. 
1. Does the Relevant Industry Recognize a Standard of Care that 
Requires the Defendant to Prevent Emotional Distress? 
If the pertinent industry has already established a standard of 
care designed to guard against causing emotional distress, then 
that fact alone provides both a threshold guarantee that the 
claimed emotional distress is trustworthy and fair notice to the 
defendant that a breach is likely to result in liability.  This is the 
consideration that the Oregon Supreme Court found important in 
Curtis v. MRI Imaging Services II,211 where the plaintiff alleged that, in 
performing an MRI, the defendant undertook  
[A] duty to explain the nature of the procedure, to warn 
of its possible claustrophobic effects, to take an adequate 
medical history in order to discover any particular physical 
or psychological sensitivities that might be affected by the 
procedure, and . . . to terminate the procedure if the 
[plaintiff] begins to experience physical or psychological 
difficulties.212  
According to the court 
[W]here the standard of care in a particular medical 
profession recognizes the possibility of adverse 
psychological reactions or consequences as a medical 
concern and dictates that certain precautions be taken to 
avoid or minimize it, the law will not insulate persons in 
that profession from liability if they fail in those duties, 
 
 210. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 211. 956 P.2d 960 (Or. 1998). 
 212. Id. at 963. 
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thereby causing the contemplated harm.213   
This consideration is also probably applicable in cases 
involving, for example, morticians preparing bodies for funerals, 
doctors delivering death notifications or news of serious illnesses, 
and psychologists treating patients for psychological disorders.214  
The source and notoriety of the standard should drive the weight 
given to this factor.215   
2. Does the Legal Interest Involve a Highly Emotional Subject 
Matter? 
The highly emotional character of the undertaking or activity 
is either explicitly or implicitly a central consideration in virtually 
every case imposing a duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional 
distress.216  Like the first factor, the highly emotional nature of an 
activity tends to both ensure that the resulting emotional distress is 
trustworthy, and that the defendant had fair notice of the potential 
for liability in the event of a breach.  
 
 213. Id. 
 214. The Curtis court analogized these allegations to “a patient’s claim against 
a psychotherapist who violates the relevant standard of care by entering into a 
sexual relationship with a patient, thereby causing depression or anxiety, or 
against a physician who inappropriately prescribes a drug that causes or 
exacerbates a psychological condition.”  Id. (citing Richard H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal. 
Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1988), disagreed with on other grounds by John R. v. Oakland 
Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me. 
1986); Kampe v. Colom, 906 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Mazza v. Huffaker, 
300 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health/Mental 
Retardation Council, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 425, 428 (W. Va. 1991)).   
 215. For instance, a standard established by statute, ordinance, or code of 
ethics could be given significant weight.  A standard established by treatise, journal 
article, or industry publication should be given moderate weight.  And a standard 
established solely by expert testimony could be given less weight. 
 216. See, e.g., Lindh v. Great N. Ry. Co., 99 Minn. 408, 409, 109 N.W. 823, 824 
(1906) (“Injury to the feelings of the family of deceased spring . . . naturally from 
disfiguration and mutilation of the body by exposure to the elements . . . .”); 
Kamrath v. Suburban Nat’l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(“[H]arm of the type Kamrath suffered, based in emotional distress, flows 
naturally from [forcing an employee to undertake a polygraph examination].”); 
Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(“There can be few experiences as terrifying as being pinned to a seat by gravity 
forces as an airplane twists and screams toward earth at just under the speed of 
sound.  The nature of that experience guarantees plaintiff suffered severe 
emotional distress during the descent and the emergency detour to Detroit.”). 
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3. Is There a Special Relationship Between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant? 
Courts are more likely to recognize a duty to avoid negligently 
inflicting emotional distress where the breach occurred within the 
confines of a special relationship rather than between complete 
strangers.217  The following elements are common to special 
relationship cases: (1) the existence of a contractual relationship or 
other voluntary undertaking by the defendant directly with or to 
the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff’s vulnerability to emotional distress; 
and (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s vulnerability.218  
The existence of a special relationship not only ensures some 
rational and bright-line limits on the extent of the defendant’s 
liability, but also provides some indicia of trustworthiness and fair 
notice to the defendant.   
 
 
 217. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203–05 (Alaska 1995) (finding 
that a doctor owed said duty to his patient); Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 
1197, 1203 (Cal. 1992) (finding that a doctor owed said duty to his minor patient’s 
mother); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 357 (Fla. 2002) (implying that a 
psychotherapist owes said duty to his patient); Rowe, 514 A.2d at 807 (“[B]ecause 
of the nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, an action may be 
maintained by a patient for serious mental distress caused by the negligence of his 
therapist despite the absence of an underlying tort.”); Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l 
Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 7–8 (Nev. 2010) (finding that a mortuary owes said 
duty to the family of the deceased); Curtis, 956 P.2d at 963 (“[W]here the standard 
of care in a particular medical profession recognizes the possibility of adverse 
psychological reactions or consequences as a medical concern and dictates that 
certain precautions be taken to avoid or minimize it, the law will not insulate 
persons in that profession from liability if they fail in those duties, thereby causing 
the contemplated harm.”); Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 
770 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that, because of the special relationship between 
a boarding school and its students, the boarding school owed a duty to avoid 
negligently causing emotional harm to its student). 
 218. Freeman v. Harris Cnty., 183 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. App. 2006).  
Although Minnesota law does not discuss the direct invasion exception in terms of 
special relationships, this explanation appears consistent with Minnesota’s 
treatment of emotional distress resulting from statutory violations.  Compare 
Kamrath, 363 N.W.2d at 112 (holding employer’s violation of statutory duty to not 
subject employees to polygraph test permitted recovery for resulting emotional 
distress), with Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 55–57, 114 N.W. 353, 
356–57 (1907) (holding telegraph company’s violation of statutory duty to deliver 
telegraphs did not permit recovery for resulting emotional distress). 
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4. Is the Occurrence of Emotional Distress a Foreseeable Consequence 
of the Breach?  
Although related to the second factor, the foreseeability 
question differs in that it focuses on the defendant’s perspective, 
rather than on the nature of the undertaking in general.219  While 
many authorities provide a convincing reason for denying 
dispositive significance to the foreseeability consideration,220 its 
well-established role in the duty analysis cannot be denied.221  But 
the highly subjective nature of this inquiry should slightly diminish 
its importance in the overall analysis.   
5. Is the Injury Likely to be Experienced by an Appreciable Number of 
the Population, as Opposed to the Rare, Idiosyncratic Hypersensitive, 
or Unusual Minority?   
The foreseeability of the injury should be examined from the 
standpoint of the “normally constituted” or “ordinarily sensitive” 
plaintiff, not the hypersensitive or idiosyncratic.222  Importantly, 
however, this consideration is not to be confused with denying a 
particular plaintiff damages because of unusual sensitivity.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the eggshell plaintiff 
doctrine in the emotional distress context, distinguishing between 
the foreseeability of some harm versus the foreseeability of the 
ultimate harm: 
 
 
 
 219. Using the example of handling a corpse, the foreseeability prong would 
provide a different result for a rail carrier employee who caused damage by failing 
to cover the casket during transport from a passenger who was unaware of the 
corpse’s presence and negligently caused a fire that destroyed all cargo aboard, 
including the corpse.  Although the legal interest invaded would be highly 
emotional in both instances, emotional distress to the deceased’s family would 
arguably be foreseeable to the former, but not the latter. 
 220. See supra notes 150–51. 
 221. See Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 152 N.W.2d 136, 
138 (1967) (“The common-law test of duty is the probability or foreseeability of 
injury to plaintiff.”); see also La Fleur v. Mosher, 325 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Wis. 1982) 
(discussing foreseeability as a relevant consideration in determining whether to 
recognize a categorical exception); supra Part III.B.1. 
 222. See Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 
1987) (“A defendant is bound to foresee psychic harm only when such harm 
reasonably could be expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive person.”); Bass v. 
Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 773–74 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (remanding for trial 
on whether the defendant could have foreseen that an ordinary person would 
suffer significant emotional distress while trapped in a stuck elevator). 
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A more difficult question is the broad problem of 
compensating one whose injuries are the result of unusual 
sensitivity or susceptibility to shock.  Much has been 
written on the subject, both by courts and commentators.  
Defendant vigorously argues that plaintiffs should not be 
entitled to recover for injuries which defendant could not 
reasonably foresee.  However, we have held that 
foreseeability is a test of negligence and not of damages.  
If defendant can foresee some harm to one to whom he 
owes a duty, the exact nature and extent of the harm need 
not be foreseeable to permit recovery for all of the 
damages proximately caused.223 
 Accordingly, this factor only examines—on a categorical, not 
case-by-case, basis—whether an appreciable portion of the 
population is likely to experience some emotional harm.  A 
plaintiff falling within this category can recover even if the extent 
of his or her emotional distress was unforeseeable because of an 
unusual susceptibility to emotional distress. 
This was the consideration that the Friedman court found 
dispositive when it denied recovery to a strict ethical vegan who 
alleged emotional distress stemming from his discovery that a 
tuberculosis test contained animal byproducts.224  Discovery of a 
putrid object in food, on the other hand, is an example of 
something that would no doubt trigger a negative emotional 
response by an appreciable or substantial portion of the 
population.225   
6. Is the Category Narrowly Defined to Ensure Commonality?   
The concern against protecting only the idiosyncratic, 
hypersensitive, or unusual minority of the population must be 
balanced against the danger of classifying categories of legal 
interests too broadly.  This factor derives from the Alaska Supreme 
 
 223. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263 
(1969). 
 224. Friedman v. Merck & Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 892–95 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 225. Several jurisdictions recognize a duty to avoid negligently causing 
emotional distress by way of contaminated food.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. d reporters’ note 
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (citing Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d 
1234 (Fla. 2001); Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1972); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 
1970), overruled on other grounds by Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets Inc., 444 
A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982)). 
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Court’s concerns when it declined to recognize a duty to avoid 
emotional distress in all cases where the defendant causes the 
plaintiff to unknowingly injure a third party.226  The test is whether 
the potential factual variations among cases falling within a 
proposed category could vary so widely that the classification does 
very little to ensure that class members’ injuries are genuine.227   
This factor also demands precise definition of the particular 
class of plaintiffs with standing to claim membership in the 
protected category.  Where the breach arises out of a contractual 
relationship, perhaps only parties to the contract can recover.228  
Where the breach derives from a statutory requirement, a 
negligence per se analysis can be used to define the class of 
qualifying plaintiffs.229  In the rare case where there is no 
underlying tort or contract violation, courts must make public 
policy distinctions to define the scope of the class.230 
7. Have Other Jurisdictions Recognized a Duty for that Particular 
Category of Activity? 
When recognizing new torts, Minnesota courts consistently 
consider how other jurisdictions have addressed the issue.231  
Similarly, examination of whether other jurisdictions have 
recognized a particular category of activity as permitting NIED 
 
 226. Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 167–68 (Alaska 2002). 
 227. Id. at 167. 
 228. For instance, a court may find that in negligent diagnosis cases, only the 
patient can directly recover for the resulting emotional distress, not members of 
his or her family.  
 229. See, e.g., Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 577 (La. 1990) 
(“In determining whether the bus driver’s violation was a breach of a delictual 
duty owed specially and directly to [the plaintiff] it is necessary to examine the 
purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether [the plaintiff] falls within the 
class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained 
of was of the kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 
2010) (holding that family members can maintain a negligent emotional distress 
claim against a mortuary regarding the handling of a loved one’s remains but may 
not pursue a claim against the county coroner).  In Boorman, the court found a 
distinction between the nature of the duty undertaken by a county coroner, who 
does not have a contract with the deceased’s family, and a private mortuary, which 
does.  Id. at 8–10.  Because of this distinction, the court held that the coroner was 
only liable to “the person with the right to dispose of the deceased’s body,” and 
the mortuary was only liable to “close family members who are aware of both the 
death of a loved one and that mortuary services were being performed.”  Id. at 8–9. 
 231. Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Minn. 2007); Lake v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 1998). 
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recovery, and the success of those decisions, should guide a 
Minnesota court’s analysis. 
8. Do Other Considerations Provide Guarantees of the Genuineness 
and Materiality of the Emotional Distress?   
A catchall factor gives courts the needed flexibility in 
responding to endless factual circumstances, changing societal 
norms, new technologies, and the unpredictable ways that genuine 
emotional distress could result from negligent conduct. 
9. Do Strong Countervailing Public Policy Considerations Militate 
Against Imposing a Duty? 
This factor is borrowed from the Third Restatement’s 
exception to the general duty rule in physical injury cases.232  Like 
physical injury cases, there may be exceptional cases where strong 
public policy considerations warrant denying liability.  For instance, 
a proposed category of activities may so strongly implicate the First 
Amendment that imposing liability could risk curtailing the 
defendant’s freedom of speech. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The categorical approach to defining the scope of NIED 
recovery strikes an appropriate balance between objectivity and 
flexibility.  Carefully identifying narrow categories of activities that 
naturally and foreseeably tend to cause emotional distress in the 
event of a breach is a far fairer, more rational, and more 
jurisprudentially sound approach to defining the limits of NIED 
recovery than Minnesota’s existing limits.  With the guidance of a 
factor-based test and appellate supervision, judges can adequately 
assure that plaintiffs will not flood the courthouses with spurious or 
trivial claims.  After that, modern science and the time-honored 
role of the jury can adequately ensure that only genuine injuries 
are compensated.   
 
 
 232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7(b) (2010).   
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